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Recanted Testimony: Procedural Alternatives For Relief from
Wrongful Imprisonment
Warren Lupel*
INTRODUCTION

On July 9, 1977, law enforcement officials found Ms. Cathleen Crowell
(now Mrs. Cathleen Crowell Webb) wandering the streets of Homewood,
Illinois. She alleged that she had been kidnapped by three young men, one
of whom had raped her. As a result of this factual recitation and a subsequent
identification, the police arrested Gary Dotson and charged him with the
crimes of kidnapping, rape, and attempted murder.' Dotson was convicted
of rape and given a severe sentence.2
The conviction must be considered the result of Webb's testimony and
credibility as a witness, because the physical evidence failed to connect Dotson
with the crime. Despite this scant evidence, the jury found Dotson guilty,
and the appellate court affirmed the conviction.' Consequently, Dotson was
imprisoned on July 12, 1979.
On March 14, 1985, Webb recanted her earlier testimony.4 She told the
Illinois State's Attorney that she had not, in fact, been raped and that her
pre-trial statements and trial testimony were false. She further stated that
she merely wanted to advance the truth and secure the defendant's release
from wrongful incarceration.
At the time of Webb's recantation, many lay persons expressed the opinion
that it was unseemly to keep a man imprisoned after his accuser retracted

* Warren Lupel, B.A., Roosevelt University; J.D., John Marshall Law School. Mr. Lupel
is a partner at the law firm of Solomon, Rosenfeld, Elliot & Stiefel, Chicago, Illinois. He
represented Gary Dotson following Cathleen Crowell Webb's recantation.
I. Although Ms. Webb indicated that three persons were involved in the alleged incident,
Dotson was the only person charged.
2. In 1984, the average sentence imposed for rape was eleven and one-half years. The
average convicted rapist actually served a sentence of only four and one-half years. ILL. DEP'T
OF CORRECTIONS, STATISTICAL PRESENTATION 9, table 5 (1984). Dotson was sentenced to twentyfive to fifty years and served that sentence from July 12, 1979, until Governor Thompson
commuted his sentence on May 12, 1985.
3. People v. Dotson, 99 Ill. App. 3d 117, 424 N.E.2d 1319 (Ist Dist. 1981).
4. Recant means "to retract, renounce or withdraw in a formal or public way a previous
statement or belief." It is derived from the Latin re (again, back) and cantare (to sing). The
act itself is called recantation. Interestingly, when an underworld character confesses to the
misdeeds of himself and his accomplices (recanting his previous statements), he is said to "sing."
COMPACT EDITION OF THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 227-28 (3d ed. 1973).
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previous testimony. In contrast to this public perception, courts consider
recanted testimony to be unreliable.' As a result, persons who seek to
overturn convictions on the basis of recanted testimony must prove that a
recantation is sincere and that prior events establish their innocence. 6 This
article discusses different procedural approaches available to one who seeks

release from prison on the basis of recanted testimony.
I.

STATE COURT PROCEDURE

Both the criminal law and the civil law provide procedural methods for

seeking release from prison on the basis of recanted testimony.' Regardless
of which procedural method is used, the petitioner must overcome an
extraordinary burden. He or she must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the recanted testimony was false, that it was knowingly and
purposefully given, and that the recanted testimony was substantially responsible for the guilty verdict.' This burden arises from a concern for
finality in the judicial process, notions of judicial economy, and the judiciary's inherent mistrust of recanted testimony. 9
A.

Criminal Law Remedies

The Post-Conviction Hearing Act governs the criminal procedure."'
This Act requires a petitioner to assert that a substantial denial of state
or federal constitutional rights occurred during the proceedings and
resulted in conviction." To succeed in a post-conviction hearing based
primarily upon recantation, the petitioner must plead and prove that

the prosecutor either (1) knew the recanted testimony was false, or (2)
could have readily ascertained its falsity.1 2 The mere unknowing use of

5. See, e.g., People v. Marquis, 344 111.261, 265, 176 N.E.2d 314, 315 (1931) ("recanted
testimony is regarded as very unreliable, and a court will usually deny a new trial based on
that ground where it is not satisfied that such testimony is true").
6. See People v. Nash, 36 II1. 2d 275, 222 N.E.2d 473 (1966) (recanting affidavit of witness
was evasive, self-contradicting, unresponsive and highly improbable, and prior events established
defendant's guilt).
7. The criminal procedure is governed by the Post-Conviction Hearing Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, art. 122 (1985). The civil remedy is codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1401
(1985).
8. People v. Hilliard, 109 III. App. 3d 797, 800, 441 N.E.2d 135, 138 (Ist Dist. 1982).
9. See, e.g., People v. Marquis, 344 III. 261, 265, 176 N.E.2d 314, 315 (1931); People v.
Bickham, 23 III. App. 3d 1074, 1078, 320 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Ist Dist. 1974).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, art. 122 (1985).
II. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-I (1985) ("[any person . . . who asserts that in the
proceedings which resulted in his conviction there was a substantial denial of his [federal or
state constitutional] rights ... may institute a proceeding under this Article").
12. Prosecutorial subornation of, or acquiescence in, perjury clearly violates due process.
Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1935).
Use of perjured testimony can constitute a due process violation even if a prosecutor's failure
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perjured testimony is not usually sufficient to support a post-conviction
petition."

Courts are divided as to whether a conviction based on perjured testimony
violates a constitutional right.

4

This division is apparent, not only among

various jurisdictions, but even among the various divisions of the Appellate
Court for the First District of Illinois.' 5 Because of this division, the forum

to discover the perjury is due to negligence. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
Such due process violations compel a re-trial if there is "any reasonable likelihood that the
false testimony could have affected the judgment of the jury." Id. at 103 (emphasis added).
See also Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972).
13. People v. Frank, 48 Ill. 2d 500, 272 N.E.2d 25 (1971); People v. Bickham, 23 Ill. App.
3d 1074, 1079, 320 N.E.2d 478, 479 (Ist Dist. 1974).
14. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit requires the defendant to
show that the prosecutor knowingly and intentionally used material and perjurious testimony.
United States ex rel, Burnett v. Illinois, 619 F.2d 668, 674 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
880 (1980); Anderson v. United States, 403 F.2d 451, 454 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 903 (1969). The Illinois Appellate Courts for the First District, Fourth Division, and the
Fifth District take the same position. See People v. Berland, 115 II. App. 3d 272, 450 N.E.2d
979 (1st Dist. 1983); People v. Oswalt, 26 Ill. App. 3d 224, 324 N.E.2d 666 (5th Dist. 1975).
Other courts have held that even the inadvertent use of perjured testimony is constitutional
error. The Illinois Appellate Court for the First District, Second Division, observed: "[kinown
to the State or not, the use of . . . perjured testimony is a miscarriage of justice which is
abhorrent to fundamental fairness and as such is intolerable. Perjury is the mortal enemy of
justice, and the battle must be waged at every level, including the constitutional." People v.
Shannon, 28 II. App. 3d 873, 878, 329 N.E.2d 399, 404 (ist Dist. 1975). Accord People v.
Cihlar, 125 Il. App. 3d 204, 465 N.E.2d 625 (Ist Dist. 1984), aff'd, Ill Ill. 2d 212 (1986);
People v. Hilliard, 65 111. App. 3d 642, 382 N.E.2d 441 (Ist Dist. 1978), appeal after remand,
109 Ill. App. 3d 797, 441 N.E.2d 135 (Ist Dist. 1982). It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove
that a prosecutor knowingly and intentionally used perjured testimony. In order to do so, a
petitioner must: (1) identify the source of the alleged evidence of perjury; (2) determine its
availability for the hearing; and (3) identify the content of the evidence. See People v. Farnsley,
53 Ill. 2d 537, 293 N.E.2d 600 (1973). It is more logical to give no weight to the prosecutor's
knowledge, because the use of perjured testimony presents the factfinder with less than the
total truth, regardless of whether the perjury is known to the state. A corrective judicial remedy
must be applied when perjured testimony contributes to conviction and imprisonment.
15. Compare People v. Cihlar, 125 Ill. App. 3d 204, 465 N.E.2d 625 (1st Dist. 1984) (2d
Div.), aff'd, 111 Ill. 2d 212 (1986); People v. Hilliard, 109 Ill. App. 3d 797, 441 N.E. 2d 135
(Ist Dist. 1982) (3d Div.), and People v. Shannon, 28 Ill. App. 3d 873, 878, 329 N.E.2d 399,
404 (1st Dist. 1975) (2d Div.), with People v. Berland, 115 Ill. App. 3d 272, 450 N.E.2d 979
(1st Dist. 1983) (4th Div.). The Supreme Court of Illinois has failed to address the issue directly.
In People v. Frank, 48 Ill. 2d 500, 272 N.E.2d 25 (1971), the court held that failure to allege
a knowing use of perjured testimony was a fatal flaw in the defendant's petition. However, in
People v. Martin, 56 Ill. 2d 322, 307 N.E.2d 388 (1974), the court acknowledged that a
conviction based on the perjurious testimony of a police officer constituted a denial of due
process regardless of whether or not the state knew that the testimony was false. The court
stated that the prosecutor need not be aware of the falsity, because the prosecutor is charged
with the knowledge of its agents, including the police. id. at 325, 307 N.E.2d at 390. The court
held in People v. Cornille, 95 Ill. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983), that the state's lack of
diligence in verifying an expert's qualifications constituted sufficient use of false testimony to
establish a due process violation. Id. at 513, 448 N.E.2d at 865.
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in which a convict brings his post-conviction petition can be outcomedeterminative.

6

Accordingly, venue is a crucial consideration when filing a

post-conviction petition.
The criminal law remedy is less attractive than the civil law remedy because
of the added burden of proving a constitutional violation. Nevertheless, the
criminal law remedy offers one attractive feature. In contrast to the civil7

remedy, where the petitioner must appear before the original trial judge,1

the criminal law remedy provides the petitioner with the option of appearing
before a different judge. 8 This avoids the obvious danger that the original
judge might act as an advocate for the original result.' 9
B.

The Civil Law Remedy

The civil remedy was the only remedy reasonably available to Gary Dotson.
In Dotson's case, there was nothing to indicate that the prosecutor knew or

should have known that Ms. Webb's testimony was false. According to the
evidence available to the trial court, the conviction was proper.2" Therefore,
it would have been difficult to prove the necessary elements under the Post-

Conviction Hearing Act.'
The civil remedy is governed by section 2-1401 of the Illinois Code of
Civil Procedure.2 2 In a civil proceeding, the post-conviction petitioner has
an affirmative duty to show by clear and convincing evidence that perjured
testimony was knowingly used in the trial. 23 If the use of perjured testimony

is established, the burden shifts to the state to prove beyond a reasonable

16. Some courts will deny the petitioner a hearing if he cannot produce witnesses or other
evidence that would substantially prove the prosecutor's knowledge of perjured testimony. The
same petition, however, would warrant at least an evidentiary hearing in other jurisdictions.
See supra note 14.
17. See I LL. REV. STAT. ch. I10, § 2-1401(b) (1985).
18. Although the criminal code mandates that the petition be heard by a different judge
than the original trial judge, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 122-8, the Illinois Supreme Court recently
found this requirement to be unconstitutional. People v. Joseph, 113 111.2d 36, 495 N.E.2d
501 (1986) (section of Post-Conviction Hearing Act that required that all post-conviction
proceedings be conducted and all petitions considered by a judge not involved in original
proceeding encroached upon area of court administration and violated separation of powers
clause of the Illinois Constitution).
19. The United States Supreme Court has recognized that some judges have a human
tendency to identify with the trial's result and that therefore a reversal is viewed as an offense
to self. United States v. Offutt, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[J]udges also are human, and may,
in a human way, quite unwittingly identify offense to self with obstruction to law").
20. This leaves aside the misleading and false nature of the forensic testimony that was
presented at trial. See Chicago Lawyer, May 1986, at I, col. 1.
21. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
22. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1401 (1985).
23. The use of perjured testimony will serve to shift the burden of proof if that use extends
to any material aspect of the trial. See, e.g., Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (principle
that the state may not knowingly use false testimony to obtain a conviction applies even when
false testimony goes only to the credibility of a witness).
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doubt that the perjured testimony did not contribute to the conviction.1
Essentially, the defendant must prove that the recanting witness is now telling
the truth. With such a substantial burden, the defendant may need additional
corroborative evidence. This task is difficult, because the petitioner has been
imprisoned for a lengthy period of time during which witnesses' memories
may have faded and physical evidence may have disappeared.
The civil remedy requires that the petitioner appear before the original
trial judge. 5 This requirement creates the possibility that tle judge may be
prejudiced in favor of the original verdict. Even if a judge could not have
known that testimony was false when given, he may not be willing to admit
that he was deceived. The judicial office in such a circumstance can be
likened to that of a baseball umpire who stubbornly defends a misjudgment
despite obvious facts.

II.
A.

FEDERAL PROCEDURE

Criminal Law Remedy

Several options are available in the federal courts for a victim of recanted
testimony. Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
a petitioner may move to set aside a verdict and substitute a judgment of
acquittal within seven days after the jury returns a verdict. 26 Therefore, the
motion for judgment of acquittal is appropriate if the victim or any other
witness retracts testimony within that short time period.
If more than seven days elapse before a witness recants original testimony,
the court may grant a new trial in the interest of justice. 27 If the original
trial was a bench trial, the court need only take additional testimony and
enter a new judgment.2 8 A motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence must be made within two years after the entry of final judgment.2 9
A motion based on other grounds must be made within seven days after a
verdict or finding of guilt, unless the time period is extended by the trial
court. 3"

24. People v. Cornille, 95 II1. 2d 497, 448 N.E.2d 857 (1983) (false testimony of state's
expert witness possibly affected jury's decision, entitling defendant to new trial); People v.
Martin, 56 I11.2d 322, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1974) (state sustained burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that perjured testimony of informer did not contribute to defendant's conviction); People v. Bracey, 51 III. 2d 514, 283 N.E.2d 685 (1972) (defendant failed to establish
the presence of perjured testimony, and even if perjured testimony was present, it was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 2-1401(b) (1985).
26. FED. R. CriM. P. 29(c).
27. FED. R. CrIM. P. 33.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
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Civil Law Remedy

Recanted testimony can also arise in civil cases. Appropriately, there are

parallel remedies available under
are similar to the above-cited
acquittal and motions for new
defendants whose constitutional

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
rules regarding motions for judgment of
trial.' Other proceedings are available to
rights are substantially violated. 2 The writ

of error coram nobis is designed to serve as a shorter version of a full habeas

corpus proceeding.33 This motion may be brought at any time in any federal
court. However, a court need not hear more than one motion from the same
petitioner. 4 Additionally, a federal court may rule on habeas corpus petitions
from the state courts if the defendant alleges that he or she is imprisoned
in violation of the United States Constitution. 5
III.

DIscUSSION

Convictions based upon perjured testimony are inherently unfair and
compromise judicial integrity. The United State Supreme Court reflected this
concern when it stated that:
[The informant], by his testimony, has poisoned the water in this reservoir,
and the reservoir cannot be cleansed without first draining it of all impurity
...This Court has . . . (a duty] to see that the waters of justice are not
polluted. Pollution having taken place here, the condition should be
remedied at the earliest opportunity.'6

31. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (motion for new trial must be served within ten days after entry of
judgment, and court, of its own initiative, may order new trial for a reason stated or not stated
in motion); FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (motion to relieve party from judgment must be made within
one year after judgment, and court may grant motion when, inter alia, there is newly discovered
evidence which, by due diligence, could not have been discovered in time to move for new trial
under Rule 59).
32. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1985). See generally W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
953-1084 (1985) (discussing post-conviction review, appeals and collateral remedies); Note,
Beyond Custody: Expanding Collateral Review of State Convictions, 14 U. MICH. J.L. REF.
(1981) (discussing the insufficiency of direct appeal to check state intrusions upon federal rights).
33. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 reviser's note (1985) ("This section restates, clarifies and simplifies
the procedure in the nature of the ancient writ of error coram nobis. It provides an expeditious
remedy for correcting erroneous sentences without resort to habeas corpus").
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1985).
35. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1985) ("The Supreme Court, a Justice thereof, a circuit judge,
or a district court shall entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court only on the ground that he is in
custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States").
36. Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) (footnote omitted) (responding to
charges that a paid government informer in the case had, concurrently with his testimony at
the trial, committed perjury in a different proceeding).
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Courts would be well advised to pay stricter attention to the rights of those
who may have been wrongly imprisoned rather than to the credibility, or
37
lack thereof, of admitted perjurers.
Gary Dotson's situation was unique in several ways. Ms. Webb was the
sole witness against him. Her trial testimony was not corroborated by any
significant extrinsic evidence. Moreover, her recantation apparently arose
from a personal catharsis and a desire to publish the truth regardless of the
consequences. Her recantation did not appear to be coerced in any way.
Reported Illinois case law deals almost exclusively with recantations by
witnesses or co-defendants, 8 rather than alleged victims. 3 9 Nevertheless, the
trial court denied Dotson's motion to vacate on the basis of existing case
law.0 The court favored the legal presumption of the unreliability of recanted
testimony over the more desired approach of a close and critical scrutiny of
the facts that led to Dotson's conviction. The guarded approach of the
courts toward recanted testimony should be balanced by a desire to avoid
the incarceration of the innocent.
CONCLUSION

Justice Felix Frankfurter has noted:
American criminal procedure has its defects. That we know on the authority of all who have made a special study of its working. But its
essentials have behind them the vindication of centuries. Only ignorant
and uncritical minds will find in an occasional striking illustration of its
fallibilities an attack upon its foundations or lack of loyalty to its purposes.
All systems of law, however wise, are administered through men, and
therefore may occasionally disclose the frailties of men. Perfection may
not be demanded of law, but the capacity to correct errors of inevitable
frailty is the mark of a civilized legal mechanism. Grave injustices, as a
matter of fact, do arise even under the most civilized systems of law and

37. Research indicates that at least 25 people have been executed in the United States since
1920 for crimes they did not commit. Nineteen others came within hours of execution before
being spared. Chicago Tribune, Dec. 23, 1975, at 2, col. 2.
38. See People v. Molstad, 101 II1. 2d 128, 461 N.E.2d 398 (1984) (co-defendant); People
v. Miller, 79 I1. 2d 454, 404 N.E.2d 199 (1980) (co-defendant); People v. Nash, 36 Ill. 2d 275,
222 N.E.2d 473 (1967) (co-defendant); People v. Hilliard, 109 111.App. 3d 797, 441 N.E.2d
135 (1st Dist. 1978) (witness); People v. Olson, 60 Ill. App. 3d 535, 377 N.E.2d 371 (4th Dist.
1978) (witness); People v. Smith, 59 II1. App. 3d 480, 375 N.E.2d 941 (Ist Dist. 1978) (witness);
People v. Johnson, 52 Ill. App. 3d 843, 368 N.E.2d Ill (3d Dist. 1977) (witness); People v.
Williams, 39 Ill. App. 3d 449, 350 N.E.2d 135 (Ist Dist. 1976) (co-defendant), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1107 (1977).
39. See People v. Montgomery, 93 111.App. 3d 498, 417 N.E.2d 686 (Ist Dist. 1981)
(subsequent inconsistent statements of victim held not to be a recantation); People v. Ellison,
89 Ill. App. 3d 1, 411 N.E.2d 350 (5th Dist. 1980) (victim (I) testified against defendant at
trial; (2) recanted this testimony at a subsequent deposition; (3) reasserted her original testimony
at a post-conviction hearing; (4) reasserted the recanted testimony out of court; and (5) asserted
the recanted testimony at a second post-conviction hearing).
40. Record at 229, People v. Dotson, 7716-5200 (April 11, 1985).
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despite adherence to the forms of procedure intended to safeguard against
them."
The law does not exist in a vacuum. It is firmly rooted in, and derives from,
the inculcation of human experience. While a court must recognize and
follow legal precedent, it must follow precedent in a manner that is equitable
and just in light of the facts of the case before it.
Recanted testimony is suspect because it comes from an admitted perjurer.
However, this is not the fault of the wrongly incarcerated prisoner. Without
selfless objectivity from a court, such a prisoner will remain imprisoned
alone, a victim of a lie too strong to be later overcome by the truth.

41. F.

FRANKFURTER,

THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI

108 (1962).

